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The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing of labor intensive activities to low-
wage economies. This trend challenges the two basic functions of the welfare state, 
redistribution and social insurance when private unemployment insurance markets are 
missing. The main results are: (i) outsourcing raises unemployment and labor income risk of 
unskilled workers; (ii) it increases inequality among high- and low-income groups; and (iii) 
the gains from outsourcing can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive linear 
income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. We finally derive the welfare optimal 
redistribution and unemployment insurance policies. 
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As international integration proceeds, large ﬁrms ﬁnd it increasingly easy to outsource
the production of labor intensive components. This trend is especially pronounced in
small European countries; in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, the value of goods
outsourced abroad as a share of domestic demand was close to 50% in 2000, and it
even approached 60% in Belgium and Austria (OECD, 2007b). An important motivation
is to exploit cost advantages. Imports from low wage countries have thus substantially
increased. For instance in the UK, the share of imports from developing countries has risen
from 18% to 22% of total imports in the period 1982 96 (Hijzen, G¨ org, and Hine, 2005).
This trends seems to have accelerated most recently. Over 1995 2004, imports from non 
OECD countries have grown substantially faster than imports from OECD countries in
most manufacturing sectors in France, Germany, Japan, UK and the US (OECD, 2007b).
Integration undoubtedly generates substantial gains on average. The beneﬁts and
costs, however, are unevenly distributed. The cost savings from outsourcing raise proﬁts
for shareholders. But asset wealth and proﬁt income is concentrated among top income
earners. For the US, Wolﬀ (1998) reports that more than 90% of ﬁnancial wealth is held
by the top 20% over the years 1983 1995. This high concentration of wealth is also found
in other OECD countries (see Burniaux et al., 1998). Unskilled workers cannot beneﬁt
from higher proﬁts since their asset ownership is insigniﬁcant. In addition, outsourcing
of labor intensive components deteriorates their labor market prospects, see Feenstra and
Hanson (1996) for the US, Anderton and Brenton (1999) and Hijzen, G¨ org, and Hine
(2005) for the UK, Strauss Kahn (2003) for France, Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) for Swe 
den and Falk and Wolfmayr (2008) for several EU countries. In general, outsourcing
reduces demand for low skilled workers, which translates into lower wages and higher
unemployment. According to OECD (2007a), the average unemployment rate in 2005
among individuals with less than upper secondary education amounts to 12.4% in Eu 
ropean OECD countries, whereas people with upper secondary (tertiary) education face
much lower unemployment rates of 6.4% (4.0%). Unskilled workers are clearly exposed to
much greater income risk than skilled workers. In sum, globalization enhances income in 
equality and exacerbates the income risk of low skilled workers. It thereby creates “more
1demand” for the basic functions of the welfare state, consisting of social insurance in the
absence of private unemployment insurance, and redistribution.
However, the welfare state itself creates part of the problem. Estimates of the elasticity
of reservation wages with respect to unemployment beneﬁts range from 0.11 0.17 (Lan 
caster and Chesher, 1983) to values around 0.4 (Feldstein and Poterba, 1984, Fishe, 1982,
van den Berg, 1990). The high beneﬁts in Europe (replacement rates are mostly 60% or
more, see OECD, 2004) thus signiﬁcantly inﬂate wages. D´ ıaz Mora (2008) estimates that
a 1% increase in ﬁrms’ domestic labor cost boosts the volume of outsourcing by 0.3%,
and adds to outsourcing at the extensive margin by signiﬁcantly raising the probability
that a ﬁrm engages in subcontracting (D´ ıaz Mora and Triguero Cano, 2007). Foreign
countries with lower unit labor costs attract more outsourcing (Egger and Egger, 2003).
We conclude that the welfare state tends to accelerate outsourcing by raising wages.
The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing for welfare policies in high 
wage economies. The theoretical model is based on two main assumptions, inspired by the
stylized facts: the risk of unemployment falls on unskilled workers while ﬁrm ownership
and proﬁt income are concentrated among top earners. We consider the insurance and
redistribution functions with two policy instruments, a linear income tax redistributing
from high  to low skilled workers, and unemployment insurance. The main results are:
(i) Outsourcing, induced by lower transport costs, depresses wages and raises low skilled
unemployment; (ii) It raises inequality; (iii) Social insurance boosts wages and leads
to more outsourcing and unemployment; (iv) Redistribution, in contrast, reduces gross
wages and unemployment of unskilled workers. By reducing the net tax on employed
unskilled workers, the linear income tax acts as a wage subsidy. It allows for higher
net and lower gross wages, and thus favors domestic employment over outsourcing; (v)
Keeping insurance constant, it is possible to use the income tax to distribute the gains
from outsourcing in a Pareto improving way if tax rates are not too high. We ﬁnally
characterize welfare optimal redistribution and insurance policies.
The paper is most closely related to the literature on integration and labor market
performance, using models ranging from classical labor supply with full employment (e.g.
Spector, 2001, and Guesnerie, 2001), to search generated unemployment (e.g. David 
2son, Martin and Matusz, 1999, Davidson and Matusz, 2006, and Davidson, Matusz and
Shevchenko, 2008) and unemployment from fair wage constraints (e.g. Egger and Kreicke 
meier, 2007 and 2008). This paper relies on a simple static model of search unemployment
because the search framework is most commonly used in empirical labor market research
(cf. Krueger and Meyer, 2002; Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007) and in the literature on
optimal unemployment insurance (Chetty, 2006, Gruber, 1997, and Baily, 1978, among
others). Although these models diﬀer in some predictions, they share common features
that are central in our model to determine unemployment and outsourcing, such as a neg 
ative relationship between wages and unemployment (see, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier,
2008, p. 177), the simultaneous increase in proﬁts and unemployment in response to glob 
alization, and the tax shifting behavior so that a higher replacement rate raises producer
wages and thereby leads to more unemployment (see, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007,
p. 4 and proposition 2, and 2008, p. 129). Our paper also includes a stylized analysis of
wage and employment subsidies as in Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) because the
progressive income tax redistributes from high  to low skilled workers and, in reducing the
wage tax, makes workers more keen to accept job oﬀers instead of staying unemployed.1
Spector (2001) studied whether a non linear income tax can make trade liberalization
a Pareto improvement.2 The key diﬀerence is that we combine unemployment and, thus,
discrete labor supply of unskilled with intensive supply of high skilled workers. This links
our paper to the income tax literature with discrete labor supply (Immervoll et al., 2007,
Blundell, 2006, and Saez, 2002, among others). Saez (2002) has shown that the relative
strength of the intensive and extensive responses is important in the design of optimal
tax transfer schedules. The extensive margin dominates at the low end of the income
distribution and can rationalize an earned income tax credit (EITC) or a wage subsidy.
Eissa and Hoynes (2006) consistently ﬁnd for the US that the EITC strongly increases
participation while the intensive response is insigniﬁcant for low income earners.
1In using a dynamic search framework, these authors can address sectoral labor reallocation, allowing
them to distinguish between employment and wage subsidies to speciﬁcally target stayers and movers.
2We use a linear income tax. We are not aware of any paper that is able to deal with non-linear income
taxation when there is unemployment and proﬁt on top of wage income. Imposing incentive compatibility
conditions in non-linear income taxation tends to restrict somewhat the possibility for redistribution.
3Our key contribution is to introduce risk aversion. All of the papers mentioned above
assume risk neutrality and focus on the redistributive and eﬃciency eﬀects. Our paper
thus complements this literature by introducing gains from insurance when private unem 
ployment insurance is not possible. We believe that this extension is necessary to evaluate
both functions of the welfare state, social insurance in addition to redistribution, and it is
crucial for one of our central results: globalization raises the labor income risk of unskilled
workers so that governments should expand the welfare state to provide better insurance.
This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Rodrik (1998) that high income countries
with a larger degree of openness and exposure to external risk have signiﬁcantly larger
social security and welfare spending.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 sets up the analytical model. Section 3 derives
the eﬀects of globalization and national welfare policies. Section 4 shows how the linear
income tax can possibly distribute the gains from outsourcing in a Pareto improving way,
and characterizes the optimal structure of insurance and redistribution policies. Section
5 concludes. The Appendix contains some technical calculations.
2 A Simple Model
The world economy consists of a high  and low wage country, North and South. The
North is endowed with a mass 1 of unskilled and a mass N of skilled agents. Firms
supply a homogeneous numeraire good in two alternative sectors. Our main focus is
on the innovative sector where ﬁrms combine high  and low tech inputs to manufacture
the ﬁnal good. In the alternative sector, the ﬁnal good can be produced with a linear
technology using only skilled labor. The South is endowed with low skilled labor only
which is employed in a linear production process with a low, ﬁxed wage.
2.1 Households
Agents are risk averse. Given wage r, skilled workers supply variable labor H earning an
hourly wage (1 − T)r net of tax. They also receive proﬁts   π = Π/N per capita where
4Π is aggregate proﬁts. Assuming linearly separable preferences, welfare VH (index H for
high skilled) is a concave increasing function of income cH minus eﬀort costs ϕ(H),
VH = max
H
u(cH − ϕ(H)), s.t. cH = (1 − T)rH +   π. (1)
Given convex increasing eﬀort costs, skilled labor supply increases with the net wage,
(1 − T)r = ϕ′ (H). Income eﬀects are excluded.
Unskilled workers supply one unit of labor at a gross wage w, if employed. The ex
ante probability of being unemployed 1 − e is equal to the ex post unemployment rate.
Expected utility is
VL = e   u(w − τ) + (1 − e)   u(b + z). (2)
To protect income, the welfare state pays a beneﬁt b in the event of unemployment which
adds to the money equivalent value z of leisure or home production (see Blanchard and
Tirole, 2008). Beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by contributions and are possibly cross subsidized by
skilled workers. The total tax per capita is τ, reﬂecting the net tax liability of a linear
income tax plus the contribution to the unemployment insurance (UI) scheme.
2.2 Firms
Technology: A high skilled agent can either produce one unit of the high tech input,
or r units of the ﬁnal good in the alternative sector. Being fully mobile across sectors, she
must be paid a ﬁxed wage r. A low skilled worker can only produce one unit of the low 
tech input without any other option. Both inputs are combined in the innovative sector
to assemble the ﬁnal output good. We make three important assumptions with respect
to the innovative technology. First, production is decreasing returns to scale, due to the
presence of a ﬁxed factor, reﬂecting unique know how or a limited span of managerial
control as in Lucas (1978). We assume that there is a mass one of innovative ﬁrms and
that each one makes strictly positive proﬁts π, reﬂecting the returns to the ﬁxed factor.
Second, we assume that the innovative technology is stochastic and requires a ﬁxed
investment f. Given type q′ ∈ [0,1], investment succeeds with probability q′, yielding
proﬁt π. With probability 1 − q′, the ﬁrm fails and is closed down. The cumulative
5distribution of ﬁrms is G(q) =
￿ q
0 g(q′)dq′. Firm heterogeneity in success probabilities
replaces the variation in factor productivity in the literature inspired by Melitz (2003).3 In
our model, all ﬁrms are symmetric within each group (integrated versus outsourcing ﬁrms)
which is a major simpliﬁcation compared to Melitz style heterogeneous ﬁrm models.4
Third, innovative ﬁrms choose an organizational form. An integrated ﬁrm produces
low  and high tech inputs in house, earning proﬁts π. Alternatively, production of low 
tech inputs is outsourced to independent suppliers in the South. Despite transport costs of
shipping inputs back home, we assume the wage advantage of the South to be so large that
outsourcing is a cost reducing strategy and yields higher proﬁts than integration, πo > π.
However, the parent ﬁrm must ﬁrst ﬁnd a suitable, independent subcontractor, transfer
the technological speciﬁcations of the required input and possibly assist in preparing
production. Hence, outsourcing requires a higher ﬁxed cost fo > f = 0, where the
integration cost is normalized to zero for simplicity. The net expected value of a type q′
ﬁrm is πoq′−fo with outsourcing and πq′ with integration. Once the ﬁxed cost investment
is successfully completed, ﬁrms are fully symmetric within each group, earning proﬁts
of either πo or π. In the following, a ﬁrm speciﬁc variable without an index refers to
integrated ﬁrms, an upper index o refers to outsourcing ﬁrms.
The sequence of events is: (i) a mass one of ﬁrms is started, each drawing a success
probability q′;5 (ii) ﬁrms choose organizational form and invest the ﬁxed cost; (iii) a ﬁrm
succeeds with probability q′. With probability 1 − q′, the ﬁrm fails and closes down; (iv)
if successful, ﬁrms start production. The model is solved backwards.
At production stage, a successful ﬁrm acquires high  and low tech inputs, h and l, to
produce raw value added y which is transformed into ﬁnal output subject to decreasing
3See Helpman (2006) for a review of the literature, and Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antr` as
(2005) for models of outsourcing.
4See also Keuschnigg (2008). A drawback is that we cannot make statements how the changing
composition of the business sector aﬀects average factor productivity within each group of outsourcing
and integrated ﬁrms. We believe that this is not crucial for the policy issues analyzed in this paper. Note,
however, that even in our model production costs diﬀer across groups.
5We do not consider endogenous entry (see eq. 11 in Antr` as and Helpman, 2004, where entry results
from R&D decisions) but take the range of ideas for innovative ﬁrms as given.
6returns to scale. The total technology is homothetic,
x = F (h,l) = f (y(h,l)), f (y) = A   y
δ, y = h
1−αl
α, 0 < α,δ < 1. (3)
Since y is linear homogeneous, the cost per unit of value added ω(r,W) depends on prices
but not on scale. The factor price W not only includes the wage but also some recruitment
cost, see below. Proﬁt maximization π(ω) = maxy x − ωy s.t. x = f (y) gives
f
′ (y) = ω, ω(r,W) = min˜ h,˜ l r˜ h + W˜ l s.t. ˜ h
1−α˜ l
α ≥ 1. (4)
Value added y and output x depend on unit factor cost. Multiplying by y gives ωy =
yf′ (y) = δx since the output elasticity δ is constant by assumption. Total proﬁts are
thus proportional to sales, π = x−ωy = (1 − δ)x. Factor demand is unit demand scaled
by value added output, h = ˜ hy and l = ˜ ly, giving total cost ωy = rh + Wl. The Cobb
Douglas technology implies constant cost shares, Wl = α   δx and rh = (1 − α)   δx.
Vertical Integration: Integrated ﬁrms produce the low tech input in house by hiring
unskilled workers on a search labor market. A ﬁrm announcing k vacancies is able to hire
l = mk workers. Maintaining a vacancy costs κ units of output. Once a suitably qualiﬁed
worker is found, there is a job rent to be shared which is divided by Nash bargaining. For
simplicity, we assume one shot matching so that no other search opportunity is available.
The ﬁrm needs h units of skilled labor and l units of unskilled labor. Anticipating the
result of wage bargaining, it generates proﬁts of
π = max
h,k
x − rh − wl − κk, s.t. l = m   k, x = F (h,l). (5)
The ﬁrm’s hiring results in the following job creation and labor demand conditions,
(Fl − w)   m = κ, Fh = r. (6)
The market for skilled workers is competitive. Firms hire until marginal productivity
is equal to the wage. With unskilled workers, the marginal cost of investing in a job
vacancy must correspond to the expected job rent. Equivalently, the total cost of an
unskilled worker, Fl = w + κ/m ≡ W, exceeds the wage by a recruitment cost equal to
the search cost times the number of vacancies needed for a successful hire.
7The wage follows from bargaining over the job rent. A worker moving out of unem 
ployment gains w − τ − b − z, see (2). Given the workers’ bargaining power γ, Nash
bargaining maxw [u(w − τ) − u(b + z)]
γ [Fl − w]
1−γ yields
(1 − γ)[u(w − τ) − u(b + z)] = γu
′ (w − τ)(Fl − w). (7)
Outsourcing: Production of low tech inputs may be outsourced to the South where the
wage rate is ﬁxed to a low ws. Given constant labor productivity, subcontractors must
earn ws per unit to break even.6 However, shipping back to Northern manufacturers loses
(λ − 1)ls in cross border transport. The subcontractor must thus produce λls, λ > 1,
if the manufacturer needs a quantity ls. The zero proﬁt price for outsourced inputs is
assumed to be lower than the Northern factor cost, λws < W.
An outsourcing ﬁrm in the North employs skilled labor to produce the high tech input








o = F (h
o,l
s). (8)
The optimal choice of inputs satisﬁes
F
o




Replacing the factor price W by λws in (3) and (4), we obtain unit cost ωo (r,λws) under
outsourcing, yielding value added yo, output xo and proﬁt πo = (1 − δ)xo. The Cobb
Douglas technology implies constant cost shares so that λwsls = α   δxo.
Organizational Choice: Due to the cost advantage λws < W, proﬁts from outsourcing
are larger once the ﬁxed cost fo is sunk. At the beginning, a ﬁrm of type q′ chooses
the organizational form which yields the highest expected present value. Outsourcing is
preferred if q′πo − fo > q′π, i.e. when the expected proﬁt diﬀerential exceeds the ﬁxed
cost of outsourcing, q′ (πo − π) > fo. The critical ﬁrm is thus identiﬁed by
q   (π
o − π) = f
o. (10)
6We close the model in a Separate Appendix (www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/41122). The
South is endowed with unskilled labor, producing either ﬁnal output or subcontracting. Constant labor
productivity and perfect mobility imply a ﬁxed wage.
8Firms with high success probabilities q′ > q prefer outsourcing. Figure 1 illustrates.
Innovative ﬁrms are independently distributed with density g(q′). The critical type


















Of all ﬁrms, s+so < 1 survive to production stage while 1−s−so fail after ﬁxed costs are
sunk. A share sf chooses outsourcing and invests fo, but only a share so < sf actually
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Figure 1: Integration versus Outsourcing
After success is realized, there are only two types of ﬁrms left in the innovative sector:
vertically integrated and outsourcing ﬁrms. Given this symmetry, total proﬁts are






The labor market for low skilled workers and the government budget jointly determine
equilibrium.7 Unskilled labor is subject to involuntary unemployment. Integrated ﬁrms
7The standard sector produces with a linear technology using up all remaining skilled labor. A separate
Appendix shows how trade balances and world output market equilibrium follow from Walras’ Law.
9post sk vacancies. Given a mass 1 of job searchers, labor market tightness, i.e. the ratio of
vacancies to jobseekers, is θ ≡ sk. A linear homogeneous technology e = M (1,θ) = m θ
determines matching rates e and m which satisfy e′ (θ) > 0 > m′ (θ). A tighter market
increases workers’ chances to get a job but reduces chances of ﬁrms to ﬁll vacancies. With
hiring per ﬁrm equal to l = mk, the matching equation reﬂects “market clearing”
e = s   l. (13)
Employment is equal to aggregate labor demand which reﬂects employment l per ﬁrm
and the number s of (integrated) ﬁrms actually hiring locally. Adding the government
budget constraint in the North closes the model,
T   rHN + τ   e = (1 − e)   b. (14)
Equilibrium is brought about by values of an employment rate e (uniquely related to
market tightness θ), and a net tax τ (consisting of the income tax plus UI contribution)
that simultaneously satisfy labor market clearing and ﬁscal budget balance.
The two policy instruments are UI beneﬁts b and the tax rate T on the skilled, reﬂecting
social insurance and redistribution policies: (i) Higher UI beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by rising
contributions (as part of τ). The government thereby shifts income from the good to the
bad state and provides insurance to risk averse workers. Insurance need not be actuarially
fair and might be cross subsidized by the high skilled. (ii) The government redistributes
from high wage earners to employed unskilled workers by raising the marginal tax rate T
to ﬁnance a tax cut or a transfer to low income individuals.8 There is no restriction on
τ being positive. A negative value corresponds to an earned income tax credit or a wage
subsidy. Its main purpose is to boost labor market participation among the low skilled
by widening the income diﬀerential between work and unemployment.
3 Globalization and Welfare Policy
This section analyzes how economic equilibrium adjusts when transport costs λ fall as a
result of globalization, or when the government reconsiders its redistributive or insurance
8The tax liability under a linear income tax is τ = T   w − ¯ z.
10policies by changing the tax rate T or beneﬁts b. We derive the comparative static eﬀects
of exogenous shocks on the equilibrating values of e(τ;b,λ) and τ (e;b,λ) by log linearizing
the model. The hat notation denotes percentage changes relative to initial values, e.g.
ˆ e ≡ de/e. Exceptions to this deﬁnition are separately indicated.
3.1 Outsourcing and Low-Skilled Labor
The supply side relates the employment rate e to market tightness θ which reestablishes
labor market equilibrium e = sl in response to economic shocks. Increased tightness raises
the chances of workers to locate a job while it reduces the rate m with which ﬁrms are
able to ﬁll vacancies. The matching function mentioned in (13) implies
ˆ e = (1 − η)ˆ θ, ˆ m = −η   ˆ θ, η ≡ −θm
′ (θ)/m(θ) > 0. (15)
On the demand side, outsourcing aﬀects the extensive and intensive margins of labor
demand, L ≡ sl, reﬂecting employment per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms hiring at home.
Log linearizing the bargaining condition (7) in Appendix A1, leads to a wage response
ˆ w = ˆ τ +ˆ b +








, ˆ b ≡
db
w




where χ ≡ (w − τ − b − z)/(w − τ) measures the income gap between labor market
states, and ρ ≡ −cu′′ (c)/u′ (c) is the degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, τ∗ denotes
the participation tax rate and, thus, the ﬁscal disincentive against accepting a job oﬀer.
This distortion tends to be high, easily exceeding 50% (see Immervoll et al., 2007, for
evidence in Europe), since it is the sum of beneﬁts lost and taxes paid on the job. If
measured in percent of gross wage earnings, it corresponds to the sum of the average tax
rate τ/w and the replacement rate in UI, b/w.
A higher tax on work and a more generous UI beneﬁt raise a worker’s reservation wage.
Since her bargaining strength assures a strictly positive job surplus, any policy raising the
reservation wage is partly shifted to ﬁrms and inﬂates gross wages.9 Bargaining implies
9Tax shifting is weakened when beneﬁts are indexed to net wages. Some tax shifting will occur as
long as wage indexation of beneﬁts is not complete.
11that job rents of workers and ﬁrms must change in proportion. Given a wage increase,
labor productivity must rise to an extent that also leaves a higher job rent to the ﬁrm.
As ﬁrms expand hiring, employment and market tightness rise until the declining hiring
probability satisﬁes again the job creation condition. In equilibrium, a higher employment
rate is thus associated with a higher wage as in (16).
Labor demand per ﬁrm follows from Fl = w + κ/m ≡ W. Unit labor costs W reﬂect
wages plus recruitment costs κ/m and increase by ˆ W ≡ w





markets become tighter, ﬁrms need to post more vacancies per employee and incur higher








ˆ e + ˆ τ +ˆ b
￿
, ψe ≡






Employment per ﬁrm depends on output and wage costs relative to the price of skilled
labor. Firms rationalize on the use of unskilled labor if its relative price increases. Apart
from this substitution eﬀect, higher unskilled labor cost feeds through on total cost
ω(r,W) per unit of value added. Applying the envelope theorem to (4), the percent 
age change is ˆ ω = α ˆ W where α = W˜ l/ω is the cost share of low tech inputs. Total costs
amount to ωy = Wl + rh. The ﬁrm’s optimal output is given by f′ (y) = ω and implies
ˆ y = −ˆ ω/(1 − δ), which determines the supply of ﬁnal goods, ˆ x = δˆ y. Proﬁts are a ﬁxed
proportion of sales, π = x − ωy = (1 − δ)x, and thus change by
ˆ π = ˆ x = −
αδ
1 − δ






  ˆ W. (18)
Labor demand follows from cost shares being constant, ˆ l = ˆ ω + ˆ y − ˆ W. To sum up, a
wage increase erodes proﬁts, output and demand for unskilled labor of integrated ﬁrms.
The extensive margin of labor demand reﬂects the share of ﬁrms opting for outsourcing
and, thus, depends on relative proﬁts. If cross border transport costs decline, the import
price λws paid by Northern companies falls and outsourcing becomes cheaper. Firms
outsourcing to low wage countries save costs, their sales and proﬁts rise. Formally, unit
costs are ωo = ω(λws,ro) = λws˜ ls + ro˜ ho and rise with transport cost by ˆ ω
o = αˆ λ. For
10We adopt the convention of deﬁning all coeﬃcients such as ψe to be positively valued.
12ﬁnal assembly, we have ˆ xo = δˆ yo and ˆ ω
o = −(1 − δ) ˆ yo as before. Therefore,
ˆ π




  ˆ λ. (19)
In raising wages, welfare policy reduces proﬁts π of integrated ﬁrms. Outsourcing becomes
relatively cheaper. In Figure 1, the line through the origin rotates down so that a margin
of ﬁrms switches to outsourcing. Labor demand shrinks in line with s =
￿ q
0 q′dG(q′).
Similarly, a reduction of transport costs makes outsourcing more proﬁtable and also erodes
labor demand. Log diﬀerentiating the discrete choice in (10) yields
ˆ q = −
πoˆ π








s   ˆ λ − Wl   ˆ W
￿
. (20)
The second equality follows upon substituting proﬁt changes and using π = (1 − δ)x as
well as lW = αδx. When outsourcing expands, labor demand falls by ds = qg(q)dq or




s   ˆ λ − Wl   ˆ W
￿






Aggregate labor demand changes by ˆ L = ˆ l + ˆ s. Upon substitution,
ˆ L = Lλ   ˆ λ − LW   ˆ W, Lλ ≡  λw
sl
s, LW ≡ 1 +
αδ
1 − δ
+  Wl. (22)
Combining with (17) reveals how labor demand changes. Using ˆ e = ˆ L, and solving for




















To sum up, net taxes or beneﬁts get partly shifted to employers, inﬂate costs and reduce
labor demand of integrated ﬁrms. Since higher wages make integration less proﬁtable,
more ﬁrms shift to outsourcing. Unemployment among unskilled workers increases. A
lower transport cost makes outsourcing more proﬁtable and reduces national labor de 
mand. Again, unemployment rises.
3.2 Fiscal Budget Balance
Redistribution implies a higher tax on high skilled households, combined with a lower net
tax τ on the unskilled. Insurance calls for higher unemployment beneﬁts, combined with
13a higher net tax on the employed unskilled workers. In both cases, the tax τ on earnings
of unskilled workers is endogenously set to balance the ﬁscal budget. Log linearizing the
budget constraint in (14) shows to which extent the net tax on the low skilled must be
adjusted. By (1), a higher tax rate T discourages hours worked of the skilled, ˆ H = −σ  ˆ T,
where σ ≡ ϕ′/(Hϕ′′) > 0 is the wage elasticity of labor supply. As usual, the change in
the tax rate is expressed relative to the tax factor, ˆ T ≡ dT/(1 − T). Using ˆ b ≡ (db)/w













  ˆ T − τ
∗   ˆ e, (24)
where YH ≡ (1 − T)rHN denotes aggregate net wage income of the high skilled. For
a given employment rate, higher beneﬁts require higher contributions. In contrast, a
higher tax on skilled workers allows to cut net taxes of unskilled workers.11 Increased
employment creates a double ﬁscal gain proportional to the participation tax rate τ∗ as
more people switch from joblessness into employment.
3.3 Policy Eﬀects
The equilibrium tax rate and market tightness must simultaneously satisfy labor market
clearing and ﬁscal budget balance. Solving (23) and (24) yields
ew   ˆ e = σET   YH ˆ T − σEB   wˆ b + σEλ   eWˆ λ, (25)
ew   ˆ τ = −σET∇   YH ˆ T + (1 − e + σEBτ
∗)   wˆ b − σEλτ
∗   eWˆ λ,
where, for later use, the coeﬃcients are deﬁned as
σEB ≡
1











The determinant, ∇ − τ∗ = 1/σEB > 0, must be positive to assure stability. Given
stability, raising the tax rate on high wage earners allows to cut the net tax burden of
unskilled households, while more spending on insurance requires to raise the tax.
11At very high tax rates, revenue might decline as 1 − T
1−T σ becomes negative (Laﬀer curve eﬀect).
However, it would never be an optimal policy to raise the tax rate to a level where this could occur.
14The immediate eﬀect of lower transport costs is an increase in proﬁts πo, leading
more ﬁrms to switch to outsourcing which erodes labor demand. For given employment,
domestic wages and labor costs are not immediately aﬀected. However, to eliminate excess
labor supply, market tightness must fall, leading to lower employment. More people claim
beneﬁts and fewer pay contributions. Consequently, the tax τ on employed workers must
be raised to balance the budget (given that T does not change). Globalization not only
raises unemployment among the low skilled but also reduces their wages.12 In contrast, per
capita proﬁt income increases for two reasons. First, cheaper low tech imports directly
boost proﬁts. Second, since more ﬁrms switch to outsourcing, the reduction in labor
demand depresses wages, thereby strengthening proﬁts of integrated ﬁrms. By (25) in
combination with (A.6) and (A.7), the average per capita proﬁt over all ﬁrms rises, and
high skilled capital owners gain. Globalization thus creates more inequality.
To ﬁght increasing inequality, governments can redistribute by raising taxes on high 
wage earners to ﬁnance a tax cut for low income households. A lower tax helps to reduce
unemployment among the low skilled. The policy acts like a wage subsidy, allowing for
higher net wages and lower gross wages, see (A.5 A.6). A lower wage bill boosts job
creation and employment. It also boosts proﬁts of integrated ﬁrms and thereby reduces
the tendency towards outsourcing. This result points to the usefulness of policies to
strengthen participation of the low skilled in a globalized economy. Finally, although the
skilled lose on account of a higher tax on labor income, they gain in terms of proﬁts.
An central function of the welfare state is social insurance when private risk markets
are missing. Our last experiment raises UI beneﬁts and ﬁnances them with higher contri 
butions which add to the overall tax burden τ of the employed low skilled. This way, the
government allows risk averse workers to shift income from the good to the bad state, cre 
ating gains from insurance. Higher beneﬁts boost workers’ reservation wages. The policy
thereby discourages job creation and raises unemployment. In adding to ﬁrms’ wage costs,
the welfare state reduces proﬁts of integrated ﬁrms and induces more outsourcing, further
raising unemployment. Via reduced proﬁts, the high skilled bear part of the burden.
12The eﬀect is not entirely unambiguous since the necessary tax increase points in the opposite direction
of a higher wage. We give a suﬃcient condition assuring that the direct eﬀect dominates over the induced
tax eﬀect. The condition by the way would also guarantee stability, see (A.4) and (A.6).
154 Welfare and Optimality
How do globalization and public policy aﬀect individual welfare in the presence of labor
market distortions and missing insurance markets?
4.1 Eﬃciency and Redistribution
Skilled workers gain from higher proﬁts but lose when labor taxes rise. Applying the
envelope theorem to (1) yields NdVH = u′
H  
￿
−YH ˆ T + dΠ
￿
. Deﬁne ˆ VH ≡ dVH/u′
H and
divide by marginal utilities to express welfare changes in money equivalent units. Add
the proﬁt change in (A.7) and substitute the change in unit labor cost,









Better access of industrialized countries to cheap labor in the South by means of lower
transport costs ˆ λ < 0 boosts proﬁts.
Welfare of unskilled workers changes by dVL = u′
E   ew(ˆ w − ˆ τ) + u′
B   (1 − e)wˆ b +
(uE − uB)eˆ e, where lower indices E and B refer to the states ‘Employed’ and ‘on Beneﬁts’.
Write again ˆ VL ≡ dVL/u′
E. Substitute u′
B by the approximation in (A.1) and uE − uB
by the bargaining condition (7), with the job rent replaced by the job creation condition
(Fl − w)m = κ, yielding, in money equivalent units,






The welfare change of unskilled workers partly reﬂects taxes and transfers. Replace the en 
dogenous tax by the diﬀerential of the ﬁscal constraint in (24). Substitute (26) to compare
with the welfare change of skilled households. Collecting terms and using (Fl − w) = κ/m
as well as ˆ H = −σ ˆ T leads to
ˆ V ≡ N ˆ VH + ˆ VL =
T
1 − T
YH   ˆ H + ewΓ   ˆ e + ρχ(1 − e)w  ˆ b − s
oλw
sl
s   ˆ λ, (28)
Γ ≡ τ
∗ + (γ − η)  
(Fl − w)/w
(1 − η)(1 − γ)
.
Welfare changes reﬂect redistribution and eﬃciency. Redistribution means that the welfare
gain of one group is oﬀset by an equal welfare loss of the other, leaving a net change ˆ V = 0.
16The skilled lose if they face a tax increase and if proﬁts decline. A higher tax directly
redistributes to the poor. Redistribution also occurs since a tighter labor market raises
income and employment of the unskilled but cuts into proﬁts due to increased hiring costs.
Eﬃciency eﬀects, equal to the aggregate welfare change ˆ V in (28), result from policy
induced distortions and preexisting market failures. A higher marginal tax T creates
the standard excess burden from distorting intensive labor supply. Expanding low skilled
employment yields eﬃciency gains proportional to Γ. Part of the gain is proportional to
the participation tax rate τ∗ in the sense of Saez (2002). When an individual switches
from unemployment into a job, she pays tax and loses beneﬁts and thus incurs a total
loss of τ∗w ≡ τ +b. This loss mirrors the double ﬁscal gain in terms of higher tax revenue
and lower social spending. Participation taxes tend to be high for low income earners in
Europe, see Immervoll et al. (2007). Being proportional to τ∗, the excess burden from
discouraging low skilled employment could thus be substantial. The second term in Γ
relates to search frictions. When their bargaining power exceeds the matching elasticity
of job search, γ > η, workers get a too high wage and thus a too high share of the job
surplus, causing ineﬃciently high unemployment. Employment enhancing policies create
ﬁrst order welfare gains. If the search equilibrium were eﬃcient in the sense of Hosios
(1990), γ = η, there would also be no marginal gain from more employment.
The next term in (28) corresponds to gains from insurance. Social insurance is valuable
for risk averse workers when markets are incomplete and private UI is not available. The
gains are proportional to the unemployment rate times the product of the degree of risk
aversion ρ and the degree of income variation χ. This term is known from Baily (1978),
Gruber (1998) and Chetty (2006), among others. In these papers, all agents are symmetric
so that there can be no welfare gains from redistribution but only from insurance. Our
paper extends the analysis to an international context.
The last term in (28) captures the direct eﬃciency gains from globalization, reﬂecting
the cost savings from better access to cheap labor in the South. Lower transport costs
λ reduce costs of ﬁrms outsourcing to low wage economies. The net eﬀect on welfare
is ˆ V = ewΓˆ e − soλwslsˆ λ. It would be clearly positive if the welfare state were absent
and labor markets were eﬃcient, implying Γ = 0. The domestic employment eﬀect of
17more outsourcing magniﬁes the welfare gains if the labor market is overly tight, γ <
η. In contrast, if unemployment is ineﬃciently high, γ > η, the net impact tends to
be ambiguous. The gains from lower transport costs would have to be set against the
eﬃciency losses from higher unemployment. These eﬃciency losses are magniﬁed if there
is a high participation tax τ∗ due to the existence of a welfare state.
4.2 Pareto Improving Policy
The basic functions of the welfare state are redistribution and social insurance. To analyze
policy, we need the ﬁnal welfare eﬀects in general equilibrium. Policy changes welfare of
skilled households as in (26). Appendix A4 derives
N ˆ VH = −IT   YH ˆ T − IB   wˆ b − (Iλ   eW + s
oλw
sl
s)   ˆ λ, (29)
where IB and IT are positive coeﬃcients given in (A.8) which capture redistributive eﬀects.
Substituting (25) and ˆ H = −σ ˆ T into (28) yields the aggregate welfare eﬀect,





  YH ˆ T
+ (ρχ(1 − e) − σEBΓ)   wˆ b − (soλwsls − ΓσEλ   eW)   ˆ λ.
(30)
Lower transport costs facilitate outsourcing of unskilled tasks. This trend beneﬁts skilled
and harms unskilled workers. Noting ˆ VL = ˆ V − ˆ VH, the results in (29) and (30) give
ˆ VH = −(IλeW + s
oλw
sl
s)   ˆ λ > 0, ˆ VL = (IλeW + ΓσEλeW)   ˆ λ < 0. (31)
Assuming labor market eﬃciency and starting from an untaxed equilibrium, globalization
(ˆ λ < 0) yields eﬃciency gains of ˆ V = −soλwslsˆ λ. The gains from trade are reduced if
a high participation tax and excessive unemployment (γ > η) result in a high distortion
Γ. Given aggregate gains but an uneven distribution as in (31), is it possible to design a
Pareto improving welfare policy? We suggest: (i) keep beneﬁts constant to protect income
of the unemployed; and (ii) implement a redistribution policy ˆ T > 0 > ˆ τ at a scale that
prevents rising unemployment and falling disposable income of the unskilled. The tax
cut (or wage subsidy) reduces the participation tax and oﬀsets the negative employment
eﬀects of globalization. By (A.5), the change in disposable income is proportional to the
18employment eﬀect, i.e. ˆ e = 0 implies ˆ w − ˆ τ = 0. If neither incomes w − τ and b nor
employment e change, welfare of the unskilled remains constant. From (25), we ﬁnd a
redistribution such that employment remains constant,




eW   ˆ λ ⇒ ˆ VL = 0. (32)
In fully compensating unskilled workers, this redistribution policy is Pareto improving if
it allows skilled households to keep part of the eﬃciency gain. Noting the cost shares
sx
soxo = eW
soλwsls, and substituting (32) into (30) yields13
















s   ˆ λ. (33)
When insurance is not cross subsidized by the skilled (T = 0), the redistribution policy
allows all groups to share in the gains from trade and makes globalization Pareto improv 
ing. By continuity, choosing a policy slightly larger than in (32) boosts welfare of the
unskilled by reducing the unemployment rate and raising disposable income of employed
workers. If, however, the government is already redistributing substantially before glob 
alization sets in, a high tax rate T on skilled households creates an excess burden which
makes redistribution more costly and reduces the chances for a Pareto improvement.
4.3 Optimal Welfare Policy
A social welfare function Λ = NVH + ξVL captures policy objectives where ξ ≥ 1 reﬂects
the concern for unskilled workers. An optimal redistribution policy requires dΛ/dT =
u′
HN ˆ VH/dT + ξu′






  IT =
T
1 − T
  σ − Γ   σE,T. (34)
13The technology in (4) implies x/xo = (ωo/ω)
1/δ−1. The cost advantage from outsourcing makes
these ﬁrms larger, x < xo. With constant cost shares, labor demand coeﬃcients in (22) are Lλ ≡  αδxo
and LW ≡ 1 + αδ




πo−π, we have LW − Lλ = 1 +
(1 − q   qg/s) αδ
1−δ > 1, since qg(q) < s(q), so that Lλ
LW < Lλ
1+Lλ < 1. The larger is the importance of
outsourcing (soxo > sx), the more likely a reduction in transport cost raises aggregate welfare.
19The left hand side reﬂects the gains from distribution when an amount IT is redistributed
from the rich with low marginal utility to unskilled workes with high marginal utility of
income. The right hand side expresses the excess burden. The diﬀerence to the standard
tax literature is low skilled unemployment and the contrast between intensive and exten 
sive labor supply. Raising T creates an excess burden T
1−T   σ due to intensive supply
decisions of the skilled. In using revenue to cut the tax τ of unskilled workers, or even pay
a wage subsidy to them, the government boosts net of tax wages w − τ. The policy also
lowers gross wages w which induces job creation and employment. It thus reduces the
excess burden from the employment distortion of unskilled workers by σE,TΓ, as measured
by the participation tax rate τ∗ which is part of Γ.
The condition for optimal insurance follows by the same steps as before,






  IB = Γ   σE,B. (35)
To provide insurance to risk averse workers, the government raises taxes (contributions)
to pay higher beneﬁts, thereby shifting income from the good to the bad state. The ﬁrst
term reﬂects the gains from insurance when private UI markets are missing. In addition,
the distributive term IB raises welfare of low skilled workers at the expense of high skilled
workers since UI beneﬁts lead to higher wages and lower proﬁts. The excess burden on
the right hand side reﬂects the participation tax τ∗ that arises when agents switch from
employment into joblessness. Starting from small values, the excess burden is zero (in
the absence of search distortions when η = γ) while the welfare gains from insurance and
redistribution are strictly positive to the ﬁrst order. Eventually, however, the progressively
increasing excess burden limits the optimal size of the insurance program.
How do lower transport costs, leading to more outsourcing, aﬀect optimal welfare
policies? By (25), this shock reduces the employment rate and exposes unskilled workers
to a larger income risk. By (31), it also contributes to more inequality, ˆ VH > 0 > ˆ VL. The
trend to outsourcing thus emphasizes the need for social insurance and redistribution. We
conclude that the optimal response to globalization is to expand the role of the welfare
state. Since redistributive taxation favors the employed unskilled population, it reduces
the participation tax τ∗ and actually makes social insurance less damaging.
205 Conclusions
The trend to outsourcing of labor intensive components puts pressure on the welfare states
of advanced economies. Based on a model of outsourcing and involuntary unemployment,
we have shown how integration, by lowering transport costs of intermediate imports,
facilitates outsourcing and impairs employment prospects and wages of unskilled workers
while at the same time raising proﬁts of top income earners. The resulting inequality and
the increased income risk of unskilled workers seemingly emphasize the basic functions of
the welfare state, redistribution and social insurance.
The need for an extended welfare state in the presence of globalization pressure arises
even if the welfare state itself creates part of the problem that it is designed to solve.
Oﬀering higher replacement incomes for more insurance boosts wages and causes higher
unemployment. By inducing even more outsourcing than would otherwise obtain, the
impact of social insurance on unemployment of low skilled workers is reinforced. These
detrimental eﬀects show up as part of the eﬃciency costs arising from welfare policies.
However, expanding a linear income tax to redistribute more heavily from skilled to
unskilled households might involve a smaller eﬃciency cost than is commonly perceived.
Since the income tax redistributes only to households earning an active wage income, it
cuts the high participation tax on unskilled workers and widens the income gap between
work and joblessness. It thereby acts as a wage subsidy which is often deemed to become
more important in advanced welfare states when the integration of the world economy
accelerates. In our model, the redistribution in favor of low skilled workers raises net
wages while, at the same time, gross wages fall. It thereby initiates job creation and
reduces unemployment among low skilled workers. Since lower wage costs add to proﬁts
of integrated ﬁrms, the policy also helps to stem the tide towards outsourcing.
Appendix
A1 Wage Bargaining: The wage impact follows from bargaining, see (7). Approximate
marginal utility by a Taylor expansion. Use u′
E = u′ (w − τ) and u′
B = u′ (b + z) as a
21short hand where lower indices E and B refer to the states of ‘Employment’ and ‘on







E   (b + z − w + τ) = u
′
E   (1 + ρχ), χ ≡
w − τ − b − z
w − τ
. (A.1)
Given uE − uB ≈ u′
E   (w − τ − b − z), we ﬁnd d
uE−uB
u′
E = (1 + ρχ)(dw − dτ − db). Sub 
stitute job creation Fl − w = κ/m into (7) and use η ≡ −θm′/m and the approxima 
tions above. Expressing the change in taxes and beneﬁts relative to the wage yields
(1 + ρχ)w
￿






mηˆ θ. Substituting again the bargaining condition on the
right hand side and using uE − uB ≈ u′
E   (w − τ − b − z) and ˆ e = (1 − η)ˆ θ yields (16).
A2 Wages and Labor Costs: Further analysis requires the general equilibrium impact
on wages. Compare, separately for each shock, the coeﬃcients in (25) to relate the
equilibrium tax rate to the employment rate,
T : ˆ τ = −∇   ˆ e, b : ˆ τ = −[τ
∗ + (1 − e)/σEB]   ˆ e, λ : ˆ τ = −τ
∗   ˆ e. (A.2)




1−ηˆ e, and use (A.2). Also use ˆ b =








w , the equilibrium relation between wages and employment is
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(A.3)
Higher transport costs boost employment which is expected to raise wages in (A.3). The
opposite case is, in principle, possible since higher employment reduces beneﬁt spending
and raises tax revenue so that τ can be cut which tends to allow for a lower wage.
This would be a rather pathological case that should be excluded on empirical grounds.
Assuming η large (1−η small) magniﬁes the direct eﬀect of employment on the wage and
makes it more likely to dominate the countervailing eﬀect of the induced tax reduction.
The following condition guarantees that a higher transport cost aﬀects employment and





1 − τ∗ − z/w
. (A.4)
22Obviously, this condition is fulﬁlled if the government sector is small (τ∗ → 0). Henceforth,
it is assumed to be fulﬁlled for positive taxes as well. Evaluating welfare changes requires
the change in disposable wage income. Combining (A.2) and (A.3) yields
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w − τ∗ − 1−e
σEB
￿
  ˆ e,




1−η   ˆ e.
(A.5)





1−ηˆ e + ˆ τ +ˆ b
￿
, can similarly be related to
employment. Using again ˆ b = −(e/σEB)ˆ e and (A.2) gives
T : ˆ W = −
1
LW
ˆ e, b : ˆ W = −
1
LW










If condition (A.4) holds, higher transport costs boost wages. The impact on gross wage
costs W is positive a fortiori if (A.4) is satisﬁed (use ψe). Note that (A.4) is also suﬃcient




A3 Proﬁt Income: Finally, consider proﬁts Π =   πN. Since dso = −ds and ds =
−qdsf, proﬁts in (12) change by dΠ = sπˆ π + soπoˆ π
o + [(πo − π)q − fo]dsf. The square
bracket is zero by choice of organizational form. Substitute (18 19) and note π = (1 − δ)x,
lW = αδx and e = sl,
dΠ = −eW   ˆ W − s
ol
sλw
s   ˆ λ. (A.7)
Since ˆ λ > 0 implies ˆ e > 0 and by (A.6) also ˆ W > 0, proﬁts unambiguously rise when
ˆ λ < 0 in the wake of globalization.
A4 Welfare Calculations: To get welfare changes in ﬁnal form, substitute (A.3) and
(25) into (26). Do this separately for T,b,λ , use (A.3) in each step, and add up, to get
(29), where coeﬃcients are deﬁned as



























σEB > 0. (A.9)
The assumption (A.4) used to sign (A.3) is suﬃcient for Iλ > 0 and, a fortiori, IT > 0.
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